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Abstract. We develop a model of complex undescribable contingencies.
These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents — their con-
sequences and probabilities are known — but are such that every description of
such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible
impact on the parties’ expected utilities. Using a simple co-insurance prob-
lem as backdrop, we introduce a model where states are described in terms of
objective features, and the description of an event speciﬁes a ﬁnite number of
such features. In this setting, undescribable contingencies are present when the
ﬁrst-best risk-sharing contract varies with the states of nature in a complex
way that makes it highly sensitive to the component features of the states.
We also show that two key ingredients of our model — probabilities that
are ﬁnitely additive but fail countable additivity, and a state space that is small
(discrete in our model) in a measure-theoretic sense — are necessary ingredients
of any model of undescribable contingencies that delivers our results.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
In many circumstances, even though contracting parties understand the consequences
and probabilities associated with a particular contingency, they fail to take the con-
tingency into account in ex-ante contracts, even if doing so may be mutually ad-
vantageous in principle.1 Starting with Grossman and Hart (1986), the resulting
contracts have been referred to as incomplete in many inﬂuential contributions to the
literature.2
Our point of departure in this paper is the observation that there are, broadly
speaking, two types of circumstances in which this failure to condition may arise; one
of which is well understood and widely used in the literature, and a second which,
although often cited informally, is far from settled at least from a formal modelling
point of view. The latter is the focus of this paper.
First, it is well understood that contracting parties may fail to condition on con-
tingencies that are “observable but not veriﬁable.”3 In this framework, whether the
relevant contingency occurs or not is observed by (and is common knowledge among)
the contracting parties. The problem is that whether the contingency has occurred
or not cannot be observed by a third party. In particular, it cannot be veriﬁed by any
third party that is charged with enforcing the terms of the contract (the enforcement
agent, usually a court).
The second type of environment in which such failure to condition on a particular
contingency arises naturally is one in which the contingency is so “complex” that the
1These contingencies have also been called “unforeseen” in the literature (Tirole 1999, p. 743).
Sometimes, we will use this term in this sense in what follows.
Of course, the fact that a contingency is not included in an ex-ante agreement, does not, in general,
imply that the outcome of the contractual situation cannot depend on such a contingency. This is
because of the possible role of ex-post implementation mechanisms (Maskin and Tirole 1999). We
return to this issue in Section 3 below.
2See Section 3 below for a discussion of some related papers.
3An exhaustive list of references here would be enormous and hence out of place. See, for instance,
Holmstr¨ om (1982) in which to our knowledge the term was ﬁrst used in its current sense, the seminal
paper by Hart and Moore (1988), and the survey by Tirole (1999).Undescribable Contingencies 2
contracting parties ﬁnd it “[...] prohibitively diﬃcult to [...] describe unambiguously
in advance” (Grossman and Hart 1986, p. 696). A formal model of this type of
environment is our goal in this paper.
One way to look at the two approaches simultaneously is as follows. In order for
complete ex-ante contracting to take place, two key ingredients are necessary. The
parties need to describe at an ex-ante stage their will to the court with full precision,
and the court needs to be able to verify ex-post in which category speciﬁed by the
contract the actual state of the world falls. The observable but not veriﬁable approach
takes away the court’s ability to verify ex-post what really took place. In this paper,
we model the diﬃculties (impossibility) that the contracting parties face in describing
their will to the court, leaving intact its ability to verify the realized state of the world
ex-post.
It is not diﬃcult to imagine real-world examples of the phenomenon we have in
mind. In the well known case of Jacobellis v. Ohio,4 Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart argued that only “hard-core” pornography could be banned, but conceded:
“I shall not today attempt to further deﬁne the kind of materials I under-
stand to be embraced within the shorthand deﬁnition; and perhaps I could
never succeed in doing so,” Stewart had said. “But I know it when I see
it.” (Woodward and Armstrong 1979, p. 94)
We conclude our introduction by noticing that there is a further reason why mod-
elling undescribable contingencies as we do here addresses more than a theoretical
curiosity. In a fully speciﬁed model of what courts do, it surely would have to be
the case that their information structure is (at least to some extent) endogenous. If
the ability to verify “ﬁner and ﬁner” events yields large potential “gains from trade,”
then the appropriate resources will be invested to endow the court with the ability
to do so. The model we develop here tells us that, even in the limit case in which
the court can verify all contingencies, the possibility is still open that the parties will
lack the ability to describe them fully in their contractual agreement.
4Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 (1964).Undescribable Contingencies 3
1.2. Overview
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the requirements
that, in our view, should be met by a model of undescribable contingencies. In this
section we also claim that some critical features of our model are in fact necessary
features of a model that meets these requirements. We then review some related
literature in Section 3. In Section 4 we set up the co-insurance problem we use as a
backdrop and derive the benchmark eﬃcient allocation that the parties can achieve
in the absence of any constraint. We then deﬁne the state space and the associated
probability measure in Section 5. In Section 6 we proceed to give a formal deﬁnition
of the notion of a ﬁnite contract. In Section 7 we piece together all these elements and
proceed to evaluate the parties’ expected utilities associated with any ﬁnite contract.
Section 8 presents our ﬁrst batch of results: we show that for some instances of our
basic co-insurance problem the only transfers that the parties would like to specify
are contingent on undescribable contingencies. As a consequence, the optimal ﬁnite
contract is to specify no transfers at all: the no-contract outcome obtains.
Section 9 brieﬂy reviews our desiderata again, and veriﬁes that they have been
achieved. In Section 10 we present our results that embody the claim that ﬁnitely
additive probabilities and a “small” state space are necessary ingredients of a model
that meets the requirements that we set out. Section 11 outlines some extensions
of our model and concludes the paper. For ease of exposition, all proofs have been
relegated to the Appendix.5
2. Desiderata and Necessity
In this section we lay out the requirements that we think a model of undescribable
contingencies should satisfy. We start by outlining the features we believe our model
should have, and then move on to “desired results.” We conclude with a claim that
some critical features of our model are in fact necessary features of any model that
meets the desiderata we have set out.
5In the numbering of equations, deﬁnitions, remarks and so on, a preﬁx of “A” indicates that the
relevant item is to be found in the Appendix.Undescribable Contingencies 4
2.1. Model Desiderata
1. Expected Utility. Recall ﬁrst that we seek a model in which the consequences
and probabilities of the relevant events are understood by the parties, and hence
all appropriate expected utility calculations can be carried out. We call this the
“expected utility requirement.”
2. Language Based. We also want to be able to take seriously the notion that we
can distinguish between physical states and their description in ex-ante agreements.6
For want of a better term we refer to this requirement as the fact that we would like
our model to be “language-based.”7
To capture this requirement, we work with a model in which physical states of
nature can be described by means of a language in which a countable inﬁnity of ele-
mentary statements are possible. Each elementary statement represents a particular
feature that can be either present or not in a given state of nature (the sky can be
either “blue” or “not blue”).
So, with little loss of generality, we take each physical state of nature s ∈ S to be
fully described by (at most) an inﬁnite list of elementary statements {s1,...,si,...}
that determine which features are present in the state. Each feature si can either be
present (si = 1) or not (si = 0) in each state.8
We identify the set of statements about future states of nature that the contracting
parties are able to specify in an ex-ante contract with the language that describes the
6Of course this does not preclude, as will be the case in our model below, that a “full description”
of a state of nature will identify the actual state uniquely.
7The objects of the (co-insurance) contracting problem that we use as a back-drop are states
of nature (see Section 4 below). As we clarify there, depending on the context, the objects of
contracting could also be some actions undertaken by the contracting parties, or the result of both
these actions and the random realization of a state of nature. Here and throughout most of the
paper we simply refer to the object of contractual interest as a state of nature.
8We limit the set of elementary statements to be at most countably inﬁnite, in keeping with the
view that in any logical endeavor a “statement” must be a ﬁnite string of symbols drawn from an
alphabet that is itself at most countably inﬁnite. Of course, depending on the cardinality of S a
ﬁnite set of elementary statements could suﬃce to pin down a state uniquely. In this case S would
have to be a ﬁnite set. The actual assumption embodied in our statement above is that a countable
inﬁnity of elementary statements is in fact always suﬃcient to uniquely identify a state s. This
implies that the cardinality of S is at most 2ℵ0.Undescribable Contingencies 5
states. There are two “competing” requirements that we wish to accommodate here.
These are model desiderata 3 and 4 that follow.
3. Rich Language. We want to ensure that our model delivers contingencies that
are undescribable because they are too “complex,” and not because the contract-
ing parties are endowed with a language that is simply “too coarse” relative to the
environment they face. Since we want to rule out coarse languages, as a minimal re-
quirement we will insist that the parties can write ex-ante contracts that vary across
any two states s0 and s00. We refer to this as the requirement of a “rich language.”
4. Finitely Describable Events. The set of statements that can be included in an
ex-ante contract must embody the notion that there are in fact some contingencies
that are “[...] prohibitively diﬃcult to [...] describe unambiguously in advance”
(Grossman and Hart 1986, p. 696). Given that we require that our model be language-
based in the sense above, there is a completely natural way to model this notion. We
will assume that only ﬁnite statements about the constituent features of a set of states
can be included in the contract that the parties draw up. We call this the requirement
of “ﬁnitely describable” events.
Notice that the requirement of ﬁnitely describable events is also appealingly weak
in the following sense. It does not require us to specify a cost function for the inclusion
of more and more features in a contract.9 Clearly, any cost function that becomes
“suﬃciently large” in the limit would deliver ex-ante contracts that are coarser than
the ones we obtain in our model.10 This cuts at once through the problem of specifying
a cost function; an exercise which, at least to some degree, is necessarily arbitrary.
It is also worth remarking at this point that since we are only restricting our
descriptions of events to be ﬁnite, our results below are immune to changes in the
elementary statements in the language that, for instance, re-code feature “1” and
feature “14” into a single one. A ﬁnite statement in one language will correspond
9Anderlini and Felli (1999) and Battigalli and Maggi (2002) are two contributions to the literature
that make explicit use of “writing costs” in a contracting problem.
10For instance any cost function that becomes larger than the available contractual surplus in a
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to a ﬁnite statement in the new one and vice-versa. This immunity to re-coding is
relevant in a world in which languages obviously evolve to capture more eﬃciently
concepts that may once have been considered complex or diﬃcult.
2.2. Results Desiderata
What are then the desiderata for our model in terms of results that embody the
notion of complex undescribable events?
1. No Approximation. Notice that our speciﬁcation of goals on model features so
far does not preclude the fact that any contingency that cannot be ﬁnitely described,
may be approximated more and more ﬁnely by events that can be ﬁnitely described.
In any model in which utilities are suﬃciently well behaved (continuous in conse-
quences) our restriction to ﬁnitely describable events would then have a negligible
impact on the parties’ expected utilities.11 This we want to rule out. Using the same
terminology as in Anderlini and Felli (1994), we describe this as the requirement that
the “approximation result” must not hold.
In fact, we seek the strongest possible result in this sense. We want a model that
displays undescribable contingencies that cannot be approximated at all by ﬁnitely
describable events.
2. Finite Invariance and Fine Variability. Loosely speaking, we are after a model
in which for some event Z the following two properties hold. First of all, neither Z
nor its complement are certain to happen. So, if we denote by µ(Z) the probability
that Z takes place, then µ(Z) must be strictly between 0 and 1. More importantly,
we require that conditioning on any ﬁnitely describable event A does not help at
all in “predicting” Z. In other words, we require that the conditional probability
µ(Z|A) satisﬁes µ(Z|A) = µ(Z) for every such A. Clearly, if these conditions hold
the contracting parties will not be able to gain by conditioning their ex-ante contract
on any event A, regardless of how mutually advantageous conditioning on Z might
be in principle. Knowing that a state belongs to a set A does not help at all to
11See our discussion of the results in Anderlini and Felli (1994) in Section 3 below.Undescribable Contingencies 7
predict whether the state is in Z or not. In the words of our title, the event Z is an
undescribable contingency.
For reasons that will become clear in the sequel, an event like Z described in-
formally above will be referred to as displaying both “ﬁnite invariance” and “ﬁne
variability.”
2.3. Necessity
Our model meets all the desiderata we have set out, in terms of both model features
and results. We verify this claim in detail in Section 9 below.
Our model also has two critical non-standard features that we discuss extensively
in Section 10 below. The ﬁrst is the use of a probability distribution over states of
nature that is ﬁnitely additive, but fails countable additivity. The second is a state
space that is a “small” (in fact countable) subset of the set of all possible potential
states (the set of all possible inﬁnite strings of 0s and 1s).
One of the goals of this paper is to show that these non-standard features are
necessary ingredients of any model that obtains the desiderata we set out. Section 10
below formally argues that this is indeed the case.
Therefore, this paper can be read in two ways. The ﬁrst is to conclude that it is
indeed possible to model formally the notion of an undescribable contingency. The
second is that the model we use below to this end, complete with its non-standard
features, is what it takes to get a formal hold of this notion. There is a sense in
which a rejection of the non-standard ingredients that we use here is equivalent to
saying that the formal notion of a contingency that is undescribable because it is “too
complex” rather than because of the parties do not have a suﬃciently “rich language”
is unattainable.
3. Related Literature
The intuitive notion of a contingency that is impossible to include in an ex-ante con-
tract, either because it is observable but not veriﬁable, or because it is “too complex”
has been extensively used in the contracting literature. In short, if we take as givenUndescribable Contingencies 8
that some contingencies cannot be included in an ex-ante agreement (although their
consequences and probabilities are understood by the agents), and therefore that con-
tracts are incomplete, we can then focus on the institutional arrangements that may
reduce the inevitable ineﬃciencies that are associated with this lack of detail of the
ex-ante contracts that the parties draw up.
This line of research has proved extremely fertile. Among other things, it has
aﬀorded important insights concerning the boundaries of a ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart
1986), the allocation of ownership rights over physical assets (Hart and Moore 1990),
the allocation of authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997) and power (Rajan and Zingales
1998) in organizations and the judicial role of courts (Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite
2003).
Perhaps precisely because of its prominence and usefulness in modelling a wide
range of economic phenomena, the plain assumption that contracting agents may face
some contingencies that are unforeseen (undescribable) has itself been the subject of
intense scrutiny in a number of recent papers.12
As we mentioned above, this paper puts forth a model of undescribable contin-
gencies that are impossible to include in an ex-ante agreement because they are too
complex for this to be feasible at all.
Anderlini and Felli (1994) and Al-Najjar (1999) are two existing contributions
that are closely related to the results presented here.
In Anderlini and Felli (1994), the contracting parties are restricted to ex-ante
agreements that are ﬁnite in a sense that is analogous to the one we postulate in
this paper. However, crucially, in Anderlini and Felli (1994), there is a continuum
of states of nature. One of the results reported there is the so-called approximation
12It should be noted at this point that the term “unforeseen contingencies” has also been used
in a number of decision-theoretic and epistemic models (see for instance Kreps (1992), and more
recently Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) and the survey in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(1998)). Once again (see footnote 1 above), here we are using the term unforeseen contingency
in a diﬀerent sense — as a synonym of undescribable. Our contracting parties understand (have
common knowledge of) the consequences and probabilities of unforeseen contingencies. They are
simply unable to describe them in advance and hence to incorporate them in any ex-ante agreement.Undescribable Contingencies 9
result: in a model with a continuum of states, under general conditions of continuity,
the restriction that only ﬁnitely many of the constituent features of a state of nature
can be included in any ex-ante agreement has a negligible impact on the parties’
expected utilities.
The restriction to ﬁnite agreements clearly precludes the agents from writing some
possible ex-ante contracts.13 Intuitively, the reason why the impact of this restriction
is in fact negligible lies in the requirement that the parties must be able to compute
the expected utilities that an ex-ante agreement generates. In short, if an ex-ante
agreement yields well deﬁned expected utilities to the contracting parties, then it
must yield them utility levels that are “integrable” as a function of the state of nature.
Since a function that is integrable can always be approximated by a sequence of step
functions, it is now enough to notice that (a “suﬃciently rich” set of) step functions
can be viewed as ﬁnite ex-ante agreements. In the terminology of our Subsection
2 above, in the model studied in Anderlini and Felli (1994), a “rich language” is
suﬃcient to generate the “approximation result” that instead fails to hold in this
paper.
Intuitively the diﬀerence between the two environments can be traced to the car-
dinality of the state space (countable versus continuous) and the nature of the asso-
ciated probability measure (ﬁnitely additive “frequencies” in this paper, “standard”
probability measures over the interval [0,1] in Anderlini and Felli (1994)).14
In Al-Najjar (1999) the state space is akin to the one used here: it is discrete and
is equipped with ﬁnitely additive “frequencies,” as in the analysis below. Using this
apparatus, in a very diﬀerent set-up from the one analyzed below, Al-Najjar (1999)
addresses the question of whether competitive diﬀerences between agents get washed
out by imitation. In a model with a continuum of states it is possible to show that
the performance of a successful agent can be replicated asymptotically as more and
13A simple counting argument suﬃces to prove this point. It is easy to see that in the world of
Anderlini and Felli (1994) there are countably many possible ﬁnite ex-ante contracts, while there
are uncountably many possible ex-ante agreements.
14As we mentioned already, we discuss the role of these two features of our model at length in
Section 10 below.Undescribable Contingencies 10
more data become available: a version of the approximation result described above
holds in this case. However, in a complex environment, imitation does not eliminate
all competitive advantages, even in the limit when an arbitrarily large amount of data
becomes available.
Two further papers have investigated contractual environments in which the ap-
proximation result described above fails. The analysis in both Anderlini and Felli
(1998) and Krasa and Williams (1999) centers on the observation that the approxima-
tion result in Anderlini and Felli (1994) requires the parties utilities to be continuous
in outcomes. The focus of Anderlini and Felli (1998) is to characterize the eﬀects of
discontinuities in the parties’ utilities in a principal-agent model in which only ﬁnite
agreements are allowed. Krasa and Williams (1999) focus on a condition that they
label “asymptotic decreasing importance” which, in their model, is necessary and suf-
ﬁcient for the required continuity conditions, and hence for the approximation result,
to hold. By contrast, in this paper the parties’ utilities are assumed to be continuous
in outcomes.
The results in Machina (2003) are also related to our work. His paper is motivated
by a search for events that embody “objective uncertainty” in a standard decision-
theoretic model. He works with a continuous state space and standard countably
additive measures (with an additional “smoothness” condition). He constructs se-
quences of events whose probabilities converge to the same value, regardless of the
overall probability measure placed on the state space. Thus, near the limit these
are “almost-objective events” in the sense that all decision makers (regardless of
their information and priors) will (almost) agree on their likelihood. In a sense, an
“almost-objective event” that has probability neither zero nor one, behaves similarly
to our undescribable contingencies that display ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability.
The key diﬀerence between the two is that in one case (Machina’s) the focus is on
what happens “near the limit,” while in the other (ours) the ﬁnite invariance and
ﬁne variability hold in the limit world, which is actually well deﬁned. As we show in
Section 10 what allows us to look directly at the limit world is our departure from
the countably additive measures and continuum of states used in Machina’s set-up.Undescribable Contingencies 11
These non-standard features are necessary for our results.
Finally, we view this paper as orthogonal to the debate on the role of message
games in models in which complete ex-ante contracting cannot be achieved (Tirole
1999, Maskin and Tirole 1999, Segal 1999, Hart and Moore 1999, Reiche 2001, Maskin
2002, among others). In particular, a number of authors have argued that message
games can in fact substitute for complete ex-ante contracting. The contracting parties
play an ex-post message game in which their private information is revealed in equi-
librium. This enables them to make the contractual outcome depend on contingencies
that the ex-ante contract neglects. As we have stressed already, our contribution here
is to model undescribable contingencies that cannot feature in an ex-ante contract.
If these are present, then the type of message game that is appropriate to the envi-
ronment at hand will be the parties only hope to condition on the contingencies that
they cannot specify directly in their ex-ante agreement.
4. The Contracting problem
For the sake of concreteness, throughout the paper we work using a standard co-
insurance problem as backdrop. Two risk-averse agents, labelled i = 1,2 face a risk-
sharing problem. The uncertainty in the environment is captured by the realization
of a state of nature, denoted by s; the set of all possible states of nature is denoted by
S. The preferences of agent i are represented by the state contingent utility function
Ui : R×S → R. The agents’ utilities depend on s according to whether or not s falls
in a subset Z of the state space S.
The two agents can agree to a state-contingent monetary transfer t ∈ R, which
by convention represents a payment from 2 to 1. We write the utility of 1 in state s,
if the transfer is t as
U1(t,s) =
(
V (1 + t) if s ∈ Z
V (t) if s ∈ Z
(1)




V (−t) if s ∈ Z
V (1 − t) if s ∈ Z
(2)
where V : R → R is a twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave function
satisfying the Inada conditions
lim
y→−1V
0(y) = +∞, lim
y→+1V
0(y) = 0.
Ex-ante, 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract t : S → R to 2, where
t(s) is the monetary transfer from 2 to 1 if state s is realized. Of course, 1’s take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer to 2 will have to satisfy a participation constraint for 2 which will be
speciﬁed shortly.
The co-insurance problem we have just described is a completely standard one.
Since in (1) and (2) we have speciﬁed the agents utilities so that complete insurance
is in fact feasible, in the absence of any additional restrictions, the optimal contract




tZ if s ∈ Z
tZ if s ∈ Z
(3)
and 1 + tZ = tZ so that
U1(t(s),s) = V (1 + tZ) = V (tZ) ∀ s ∈ S (4)
and
U2(t(s),s) = V (−tZ) = V (1 − tZ) ∀ s ∈ S (5)
Agent 2’s participation constraint can be easily speciﬁed if we deﬁne the proba-
bility p = Pr{s ∈ Z} that s falls in Z. In the absence of any agreed transfers 2’s
expected utility is pV (0)+(1−p)V (1). Since 2 is the recipient of a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer, his participation constraint will bind. Therefore, in addition to (4) and (5) theUndescribable Contingencies 13
optimal contract t∗ is characterized by
pV (−tZ) + (1 − p)V (1 − tZ) = pV (0) + (1 − p)V (1) (6)
Clearly, equations (4), (5) and (6) uniquely pin down the values of tZ and tZ, so
that the characterization of the solution to our co-insurance problem in the standard
case is complete.
Before we move on to a detailed description of our state space and the probability
measure that we place on it, it is worth emphasizing here that the co-insurance prob-
lem that we use to exemplify our results is adopted mostly for the sake of simplicity.
In fact our results in this paper can be easily translated to apply to other contracting
problems.
Starting with Hart and Moore (1988) a class of models that fall within the fol-
lowing broad sketch has become somewhat canonical in the incomplete contracting
literature.15 Two contracting parties, a buyer and a seller, have the opportunity to
undertake an ex-ante unobservable relationship-speciﬁc investment that aﬀects the
cost and/or value of the object (a “widget”) of the potential exchange. Subsequently,
the cost and value of the widget are realized, typically as a function of the realiza-
tion of a state of nature as well as of the levels of relationship-speciﬁc investment.
The presence of non-contractible variables in this set-up then gives rise to a hold-
up problem, which in turn determines ineﬃcient levels of ex-ante investments. In
particular the ex-ante investments, the actual cost and value of the widget and the
state of nature cannot be directly contracted on, even though it would be advanta-
geous in principle to the parties to write an ex-ante contract that conditions the sale
price of the widget (and possibly whether the exchange is to take place or not) on (a
combination of) these variables.
Our results below could be applied, virtually unchanged, to yield a model of the
15What follows is not meant to be a summary description of the actual model analyzed in Hart
and Moore (1988), but merely a description of the main ingredients common to many contributions
to this area of the literature. We also refer the reader to our earlier discussion of related literature
in Section 3 above.Undescribable Contingencies 14
type we have just outlined in which one or more of the relevant variables cannot be
proﬁtably included in an ex-ante contract because the relevant contingencies are too
complex.
5. States and Probabilities
We are now ready to proceed with a formal description of our state space S and the
associated probability measure µ.
As we mentioned above, both of these ingredients of our model are not of a
standard form. They are building blocks of a world in which details, no matter how
small, can matter a lot. The inability to capture these details in any ﬁnite ex-ante
agreement is at the center of our model of complex undescribable contingencies.
A discussion of our modelling choices is postponed until Section 10 below.
5.1. The State Space
We think of there being a countable inﬁnity of physical states of the world S =
{s1,...,sn,...}.
The parties have a common language to describe each state sn. The language
consists of a countable inﬁnity of elementary statements (characteristics) that can
be true or false about each state of nature sn. Hence the complete description of a
state of nature sn can be thought of as an inﬁnite sequence {s1
n,...,si
n,...} of 0’s and
1’s. Each element of the sequence is simply interpreted as reporting whether the i-th
elementary statement is true (si
n = 1) or false (si
n = 0) about state sn.
The formal deﬁnition of our state space simply encapsulates what we have stated
so far about S.
Deﬁnition 1. State Space: The state space S is a countably inﬁnite set {s1, s2,




n ∈ {0,1} for every i and n.Undescribable Contingencies 15
5.2. Probabilities
As we mentioned already, the probability measure µ that we place over S is non-
standard in the sense that it fails countable additivity. Again, we postpone a discus-
sion of this and other features of our model until Section 10 below.
Our ﬁrst step is to deﬁne the density of a set of states.
Deﬁnition 2. Density: Given any Q ⊆ S, let χQ denote the characteristic function
of Q so that χQ(sn) = 1 if sn ∈ Q and χQ(sn) = 0 if sn 6∈ Q. We deﬁne the density








when the limit in (7) exists. The density is otherwise left undeﬁned. We denote by
D the collection of subsets of S that have a well deﬁned density.
Two points should be noted. First, the density of a set µ(Q) is its “frequency”
in the standard sense of the word. Thus, for instance, every ﬁnite set of states has a
density of zero and the set of all “even numbered” states {s2,s4,s6,...} has a density
of 1/2. Second, the density of a set (and whether or not it is well deﬁned) depends on
the ordering of the states {s1,...,sn,...}. This ordering is taken as given and ﬁxed
throughout the paper.16
We conclude this subsection with two observations that will become useful below.
First, given two sets Q0 and Q00 that have well deﬁned densities and such that
µ(Q0) > 0 and µ(Q0 ∩ Q00) is also well deﬁned, we can deﬁne the conditional density
µ(Q00 | Q0) as µ(Q0 ∩ Q00)/µ(Q0).
Secondly, if we let Σ be the set of all subsets of S. Then there exists an extension
to Σ of the density µ in Deﬁnition 2 above which is a ﬁnitely additive probability
measure. In other words
16The class of permutations of the states of nature that leave our results unaﬀected includes all
ﬁnite permutations. We do not attempt a general characterization of such permutations in this
paper.Undescribable Contingencies 16
Remark 1. Finitely Additive Probability Measure: There exists a ﬁnitely additive
probability measure ˜ µ over (S,Σ) that for every set of states B ⊂ S satisﬁes ˜ µ(B) =
µ(B), whenever µ(B) is deﬁned.17
6. Finitely Deﬁnable Sets and Finite Contracts
The set of ex-ante contracts that our agents can draw up intuitively coincides with
those agreements that are ﬁnite in a sense to be deﬁned shortly in a formal way.
It is convenient to start our description of what a ﬁnite contract is by introducing
the notion of a ﬁnitely deﬁnable set. Intuitively, these are subsets of S that can be
deﬁned referring only to a ﬁnite set of their features.
For each state of nature sn, let si
n ∈ {0,1} indicate the value of the i-th feature
of sn. Deﬁne also
A(i,j) = {sn ∈ S such that s
i
n = j} (8)
so that A(i,j) is the set of states that have the i-th feature equal to j ∈ {0,1}.
These are the elementary statements of the underlying language to which we referred
informally in Subsection 2 above.
We are now ready to deﬁne the ﬁnitely deﬁnable subsets of S. These are the sets
that can be described in the language of our contracting parties.
Deﬁnition 3. Finitely Deﬁnable Sets: Consider the algebra of subsets of S gener-
ated by the collection of sets of the type A(i,j) deﬁned in (8). Let this algebra be
denoted by A. We refer to any A ∈ A as a ﬁnitely deﬁnable set.
Elements of A can be obtained by complements and/or ﬁnite intersections and/or
ﬁnite unions of the sets A(i,j). Hence every element of A can be deﬁned by ﬁnitely
many elementary statements about the features of the states of nature that it contains.
17See, for example, Rao and Rao (1983, p. 41) for a proof.Undescribable Contingencies 17
A suitable deﬁnition of a ﬁnite contract is now easy to get. The key feature of
a ﬁnite contract is that it should specify a set of transfers that is conditional only
on ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets. For simplicity we also restrict attention to contracts that
specify a ﬁnite set of values for the actual transfer t. This is clearly without loss of
generality in our simple co-insurance problem described in Section 4 above.
Deﬁnition 4. Finite Contracts: A contract is ﬁnite if and only if the transfer rule
t(·) that it prescribes is measurable with respect to A, and takes ﬁnitely many values
{t1,...,tM}. The set of ﬁnite contracts is denoted by F.
While it is possible, as we do here, to take Deﬁnition 4 as a primitive that embodies
the notion of a contract as a ﬁnite object, it is important to point out that this
requirement can be supported in a diﬀerent way (than just taking Deﬁnition 4 at face
value).
Anderlini and Felli (1994) put forward the idea that it is natural to consider
contracts that yield a value for a sharing rule that is computable by a Turing machine
as a function of the state of nature. The justiﬁcation for this requirement is a claim
that if a function is computable in a ﬁnite number of steps by any imaginable ﬁnite
device then it must be computable by a Turing machine.18 Obviously, any ﬁnite
contract must be computable. It is also possible to show that the converse holds:
requiring that contracts be ﬁnite exhausts the set of all computable contracts. For
reasons of space, we omit any formal analysis of this topic.
7. Computing Expected Utilities
We now have set out all the ingredients of our model. In essence we want to char-
acterize what the agents can achieve using ﬁnite contracts when the state space and
associated probability measure are as in Section 5.
As we mentioned already, we want to restrict attention to those cases in which the
agents can base their choices on the expected utility that an ex-ante contract yields.
18This claim is known in the literature on computable functions as Church’s thesis. See for instance
Cutland (1980), or Rogers (1967).Undescribable Contingencies 18
Since we want the agents to be able to contemplate all possible ﬁnite contracts, we
need to ensure that all such contracts can be evaluated in this way. So far, there is
nothing in our framework that guarantees that this is the case. This is because our
Deﬁnition 2 above does not, by itself, guarantee that all ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets have a
well deﬁned density. The proposition that follows guarantees that this can indeed be
done.
Proposition 1. Existence: There exists a state space S as in Deﬁnition 1 such that
every A ∈ A has a well deﬁned density µ(A). In other words, there exists an S such
that A ⊆ D.
The proof of Proposition 1 is a simple consequence of the law of large numbers.
Think of S as a realization of countably many i.i.d. draws from, say, a (countably
additive) density ˆ µ over {0,1}N. It is then suﬃcient to observe that the law of large
numbers guarantees that, with probability one, the limit frequency of draws that falls
into any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set A is in fact well deﬁned and equal to its density ˆ µ(A).
The set of realizations of these i.i.d. draws that have the properties required by the
statement of the proposition has probability one in the space of realizations of this
process. It then follows that it must be not empty. Hence, setting S to be equal to a
“typical” realization of these i.i.d. draws as described is suﬃcient to prove the claim.
To evaluate the expected utility accruing to each party from any ﬁnite contract
we will also need to refer to the conditional densities of certain events. This is an easy
task if we restrict attention to ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets. The following remark is stated
without proof since it is a direct consequence of the fact that, by assumption, since A
is an algebra, the intersection of two ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets is itself ﬁnitely deﬁnable.
Remark 2. Well Deﬁned Conditional Densities: Let S be as in Proposition 1 and
let A0 and A00 be two ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets with µ(A0) > 0. Then the conditional
density µ(A00 | A0) is well deﬁned.Undescribable Contingencies 19
Of course, to compute the expected utility of a ﬁnite contract, the parties must
be able to compute more than the frequencies of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets. They need to
compute the density of the intersection of Z with any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set.
Our next deﬁnition makes precise what it means for a set of states to meet this
requirement.
Deﬁnition 5. Well-Deﬁned Frequencies: A set Z has well deﬁned frequencies if
Z ∩ A ∈ D ∀ A ∈ A
in other words Z has a well deﬁned density, conditional on any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set
A (provided of course that µ(A) > 0).
We have now introduced all the elements that will allow us to study a class of
co-insurance problems in which undescribable contingencies can arise, and in which
the expected utilities for both agents from any ﬁnite contract are well deﬁned and
can be computed in a simple way.
The fact that undescribable contingencies can arise in this model is the subject of
our next section. For the time being, we remark that the expected utilities from any
ﬁnite contract are well deﬁned.
Our next statement takes the shape of a deﬁnition (rather than a proposition)
since we are in fact deﬁning what the natural meaning of expected utilities is in a
world in which probabilities are equated with the densities of Deﬁnition 2 above.
Deﬁnition 6. Expected Utilities: Consider the co-insurance problem described in
Section 4. Let a density µ as in Deﬁnition 2 be given and let S be as in Propo-
sition 1. Assume further Z has well deﬁned frequencies in the sense of Deﬁnition 5.
Let also any ﬁnite contract t : S → {t1,...,tM} be given. Then the expected utility
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We conclude this section with an observation. Using the ﬁnitely additive probabil-
ity measure ˜ µ of Remark 1 that extends µ to all subsets of S it is possible to compute
the density of every set D ∈ Σ. This in turn would allow us to compute the expected
utility of a much broader class of contracts that are not necessarily ﬁnite, allowing
also for a much broader class of state-dependent utilities. Of course, to do this we
would need a way to integrate a much broader class of functions than we eﬀectively
do in (9) and (10) above. Fortunately, there is an elaborate theory of integration with
respect to ﬁnitely additive probabilities, which for the most part is analogous to the
usual theory of integration.19
In this paper, we restrict attention to contracts that are measurable with respect
to A and to contracting problems in which Z has well deﬁned frequencies in the sense
of Deﬁnition 5. Of course, when we restrict attention to this case, the more general
type of integration that we are referring to gives exactly the expected utilities that
we have deﬁned above.20
To simplify matters further, we also restrict attention (without any loss of gen-
erality in our co-insurance setup) to contracts that take a ﬁnite number of values.
It should be noted, however, that the restriction to ﬁnitely-valued functions, is in-
troduced only for expository simplicity; our analysis is applicable more generally
(although this would require some additional machinery).
19Dunford and Schwartz (1958) is a classic textbook which provides a uniﬁed treatment of inte-
gration for both ﬁnite and countably additive measures. A more specialized treatment can be found
in Rao and Rao (1983).
20We proceed as we do here instead than using the more general machinery that we have referred
to because this makes our results more transparent in at least two ways. First, all equations (9)
and (10) of Deﬁnition 6 allow the reader to look “directly inside” what would otherwise be buried
in the deﬁnition of an “exotic” integral sign. Second, and more important, this way of proceeding
clariﬁes the fact that our results below depend only of the rather intuitive (frequencies) properties
of the density µ rather than on its non-unique extension to the power set Σ.Undescribable Contingencies 21
8. Complex Undescribable Contingencies
8.1. Finite Invariance and Fine Variability
In contrast to the cases of a continuous state space and of a countable state space with
a countably additive probability measure, ﬁnite contracts cannot always approximate
the ﬁrst best in the model we have set-up here. The idea is that the allocation t∗
that the agents may be trying to attain could exhibit ﬁne variability as a function
of the state of nature. Any ﬁnite contract is bound not to capture part (or all) of
this variability. It is important to stress again that this is in fact possible when the
state-dependence of the agents’ preferences is such that the expected utility of any
ﬁnite contract (Deﬁnition 6) is well deﬁned.
We begin with two abstract deﬁnitions that capture the idea that in the model we
have set up it is possible that a set Z may “look the same” if we look at its restriction
over any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set, but at the same time may have a characteristic function
that varies “ﬁnely” with the state of nature. It will be precisely this type of ﬁne
variability that ﬁnite contracts cannot capture and hence give rise to undescribable
contingencies below.
Deﬁnition 7. Finite Invariance: We say that Z ⊆ S displays ﬁnite invariance if for
every A ∈ A with µ(A) > 0,
µ(Z|A) = µ(Z) (11)
So, Z displays ﬁnite invariance if its density is the same conditional on all ﬁnitely
deﬁnable sets that have positive measure under µ.
In other words, if Z displays ﬁnite invariance, knowing that s belongs to any
ﬁnitely deﬁnable subset of S does not help us to “predict” better whether it belongs
to Z or to its complement. It should be noted at this point that the possibility that
Deﬁnition 7 may have a non-trivial content is a feature of the model we have set up,
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measurable set. In fact, it is clear that in this case if Z displays ﬁnite invariance then
it must have measure either 0 or 1. This is not the case in our model, as we will
demonstrate shortly in Proposition 2 below.
The second abstract deﬁnition that we state is a property that we have labelled
ﬁne variability.21
Deﬁnition 8. Fine Variability: Let Z be a set that displays ﬁnite invariance.
We say that Z displays ﬁne variability if and only if
0 < µ(Z) < 1
The properties that we have just deﬁned may simultaneously hold for a set Z that
also has well deﬁned frequencies as in Deﬁnition 5. Our next proposition asserts that,
for some state spaces S as in Proposition 1 even though a set Z may have well deﬁned
frequencies and display ﬁnite invariance, its characteristic function may be far from
being constant over S.
Proposition 2. Finite Invariance and Fine Variability: There exists an S such that
the following is true.
Let any p ∈ (0,1) be given. Then there exists a set Z with well deﬁned frequencies
that displays both ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability and such that µ(Z) = p.
The formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. Here we only sketch the
argument for the case p = 1/2. Let S be as in Proposition 1. We can then construct
Z in the following way. For each given state of nature sn ∈ S we set sn ∈ Z and
sn ∈ Z with equal probability, and with i.i.d draws across all the states sn. The law
of large numbers again guarantees that we can take Z to be a “typical” realization
21Notice that we use the word “variability” with reference to a set. This is not as odd as it may
seem at ﬁrst sight. In our view the best intuitive way to think about the content of Deﬁnition 8
below is that of a set that has a characteristic function that varies “very ﬁnely” with the state of
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of this process to prove the claim. In fact, in any such typical realization, the law of
large numbers ensures that the event Z has a density that is well deﬁned and is equal
to 1/2 conditional on any ﬁnitely deﬁnable subset of states. This clearly guarantees
that Z displays ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability, as well as having well deﬁned
frequencies, as required. As we mentioned above, the type of ﬁne variability that is
found in Proposition 2 is at the root of our model of undescribable contingencies.
Our next task is to examine its impact on the simple co-insurance model described
in Section 4 above.
Before proceeding any further, it is useful to dwell further on how our two results
stated so far are proved. The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 reported in the Appendix
both rely on the law of large numbers. These arguments are appealing in the sense
that they also show that state spaces S as in Proposition 1 and a Z as in Proposition
2 are not “knife-edge” cases in any sense of the word. This is so because the stochastic
processes that we use in the two proofs in the Appendix yield a set of probability
one of realizations in which the two statements hold. However, it is legitimate at this
point to ask whether there are constructive arguments that can be used to prove the
two claims.
The answer to the question is aﬃrmative.22 In fact, the following construction
proves both Proposition 1 and 2.23 We outline it for the case in which µ(A(i,j))
22We are indebted to an anonymous referee for asking the question, and for suggesting the answer.
23It may be argued that the set Z in this example is not complex, and that it is (obviously)
describable—after all, the construction that follows is its description. We believe this to be mislead-
ing, however. To appreciate this point, let N be the set of natural numbers and ﬁx any countable
state space S. Call a function e : N → S an enumeration if it is one-one and onto (thus, under e, we
are labelling a state s ∈ S as the e−1(s)-th state). Given any inﬁnite subset Z ⊂ S, it is obviously
possible to ﬁnd an enumeration eZ under which Z has a simple description. For instance, one can
easily ﬁnd an eZ under which Z corresponds to (i.e. e
−1
Z (Z) is) the set of even integers. Obviously
Z is simple to describe, but only given the enumeration eZ.
To use the labels in N given by e to identify a set, the description of a set must therefore include a
full speciﬁcation of the enumeration needed to give it a simple representation (e.g. as the set of even
integers) — an inﬁnite object by itself. The contracting agents in our model are endowed with a
given language, that corresponds to describability in terms of a ﬁxed set of features. This language
is the only available vehicle to convey their will to the court. Thus, the integer labels of the states
are meaningless to our contracting agents in identifying any particular set of states in an ex-ante
contract. The set Z in this example is not describable in the language determined by these features.Undescribable Contingencies 24
= 1/2 for every i and every j, and µ(Z) = 1/2. Start with the states just being
identiﬁed by their labels, the positive integers. Now assign all odd numbered states
to Z and all even states to Z. Among those states that have been placed in Z, assign
a value of 0 for the ﬁrst feature to the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth state and so on (states 1, 5,
9 etc.), and a value of 1 to the other states. Among the states that were placed in Z
assign a value of 1 for the ﬁrst feature to the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth state and so on (states
2, 6, 10 etc.), and a value of 0 to the other states. So now we have four subsets of
states, identiﬁed by whether the state is in Z or Z and whether the ﬁrst feature is 0
or 1.
Now we can divide each of these four subsets into two subsets as follows. Among
those states that have been placed in Z with ﬁrst feature 0, assign a value of 0 for
the second feature to the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth state and so on (states 1, 9, 17 etc.), and a
value of 1 to the other states. Among those states that have been placed in Z with
ﬁrst feature 1, assign a value of 0 for the second feature to the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth state
and so on (states 3, 11, 19 etc.), and a value of 1 to the other states. Symmetrically,
among the states that were placed in Z with ﬁrst feature 1 assign a value of 1 for the
second feature to the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth state and so on (states 2, 10, 18 etc.), and a
value of 0 to the other states. Finally, among the states that were placed in Z with
ﬁrst feature 0 assign a value of 1 for the second feature to the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth state
and so on (states 4, 12, 20 etc.), and a value of 0 to the other states.
We can then complete the construction by subdividing the 16 subsets of states
into two sets each in the same fashion, and continuing ad inﬁnitum in the same way.24
24A schematic representation of the construction we have outlined is as follows.
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It is then easy to verify that all the requirements of Propositions 1 and 2 are
satisﬁed with µ(A(i,j)) = 1/2 for every i and every j, and µ(Z) = 1/2.
8.2. Undescribable Contingencies and Fine Variability
The possibility that the contract t∗ in the co-insurance problem described in Section
4 above may have the ﬁne variability described in Proposition 2 has far reaching
consequences on what the contracting parties can achieve by means of a ﬁnite contract.
In this section, we characterize the impact of ﬁne variability when it is associated
with ﬁnite invariance. In this case, any ﬁnite contract will be unable to capture any
of the ﬁne variability of t∗. As a consequence the agents will choose a trivial contract
that prescribes a transfer of t = 0 in every possible state. This is of course the same
as saying that no contract will be drawn up.
Consider the co-insurance problem described in Section 4. For a given S, µ and
Z, let t∗∗ be the optimal ﬁnite co-insurance contract, if it exists. In other words, if it
is well deﬁned let t∗∗ be the solution to
max
t EU1(t)
s.t. EU2(t) ≥ µ(Z)V (0) + µ(Z)V (1)
t ∈ F
(12)
where EUi(t) are the parties’ expected utilities as in Deﬁnition 6 above.
Proposition 3. Optimal Finite Contract: Consider the co-insurance problem desc-
ribed in Section 4. Then there exist an S, µ and Z with µ(Z) ∈ (0,1) with the
following properties.
1. The set Z has well deﬁned frequencies.
2. The optimal ﬁnite contract t∗∗ that solves problem (12) exists unique, up to a set
of states of µ-measure zero.Undescribable Contingencies 26
3. The optimal ﬁnite contract t∗∗ prescribes no transfer between the agents in every
state of nature. In other words t∗∗(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S, up to a set of states of
µ-measure zero.
Once again the formal proof of Proposition 3 is presented in the Appendix. Intu-
itively, Proposition 3 is a fairly direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 coupled
with the strict concavity (in t) of the agents’ preferences.
Again, we start with an S as in Proposition 1. Recall now that in the co-insurance
problem described in Section 4 above the parties are able to achieve full insurance
by agreeing on a transfer contingent on the event Z. We now choose the event Z to
display ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability as in Proposition 2. Let pZ and pZ be
the densities of Z and Z respectively, conditional on any A ∈ A.
Notice that by deﬁnition of ﬁnite invariance the event Z has been deﬁned so that
any attempt by the parties to condition on a ﬁnite set of characteristics (the only
feasible ex-ante description available to them) will leave them with a set of states
of which only a fraction pZ actually belongs to Z. This is true whatever ﬁnitely
deﬁnable subset of S the parties decide to condition their contract on. The fact
that the parties are risk averse now implies that the optimal ﬁnite contract should
specify the same transfer from 2 to 1 contingent on any ﬁnitely deﬁnable subset of
S. Any transfer function that varies across two ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets of states will
be strictly dominated (in terms of the parties expected utility) by a constant transfer
that coincides with the average of the transfer function we started from.
The optimal contract t∗∗ is now immediately obtained from the observation that
the only constant (across all states) transfers from 2 to 1 that are compatible with 2’s
participation constraint are non-positive. Since 1’s expected utility is monotonically
increasing in the constant transfer from 2, the optimal ﬁnite contract must clearly
prescribe a transfer of 0 in all states.
The allocation entailed by the optimal ﬁnite contract coincides with the no-
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risk averse implies that party 1’s expected utility associated with the no-contract
outcome is bounded away from the full-insurance contract t∗ described in Section 4.
In our terminology, the event Z is an undescribable (or unforeseen) contingency.
The agents understand its probability pZ and use it in their expected utility compu-
tations. However, no matter how ﬁnely they attempt to describe it in a ﬁnite ex-ante
agreement, they will only be correct a fraction pZ of the time. The extreme prediction
that the parties will choose an allocation equivalent to no-contract at all of course
derives from the particular event Z we constructed above in the sense that it displays
ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability.
9. Desiderata Re-Visited
In Section 2 above we set key characteristics that a model of undescribable contin-
gencies should, in our view, possess. There, we also speciﬁed what results should
be true in a model of undescribable contingencies. In this section we brieﬂy review
our desiderata and verify that they are indeed met by our model. We also reﬁne
our desiderata in terms of results in a way that could not be speciﬁed up-front for
technical reasons.
Our Model Desiderata 1 was that the contracting parties should be able to evaluate
ex-ante contracts by means of expected utility. In view of Deﬁnition 6 above, this we
have clearly achieved.
Our Model Desiderata 2 was that it should be language-based, so that the notion
of a ﬁnite statement could be anchored to the underlying language used to describe
the states. Clearly, the model that we put forth in Sections 5 and 6 satisﬁes this
requirement. Each state (or set of states) is identiﬁed by the constituent features
that describe it.
Our set-up also clearly meets Model Desiderata 3 of a rich language. Indeed, it
does so in a stronger sense of the term than the “separation” property that we spelled
out in Section 2 above.25 Recall that meeting the requirement of a rich language is key
25The algebra of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets A of Deﬁnition 3 is capable of “approximating” any stateUndescribable Contingencies 28
to our claim that our model captures contingencies that are undescribable because
they are too complex, and not because the parties’ language or their information is
too coarse for the task.
Deﬁnition 4 above specifying what we mean by a ﬁnite contract, and the deﬁnition
(3) of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets clearly meet Model Desiderata 4 of ﬁnitely describable
events that we set forth above.
From Proposition 2 it is also clear that the approximation result does not hold in
our model in the strong sense that our model displays both ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne
variability. Hence Results Desiderata 1 and 2 are met.
Our model delivers a version of these results that is in some sense stronger than
we speciﬁed in Section 2 above. It is worth expanding on this point as it could not be
addressed fully in our introductory remarks, before the formal results were laid out.
The set Z of Proposition 3 above that exhibits ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability
is in some intuitive sense expressible in the language deﬁned by the features that
describe each state of nature. Simply, Z is not expressible by any ﬁnite statement in
the language. The formal counterpart of the intuitive claim we have just made is the
following. It is in fact the case that the undescribable contingency Z is in the sigma
algebra σ(A) generated by the algebra A of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets.26 So, if we were
to allow (countably) inﬁnite statements in the language, we would be able to capture
Z exactly.
The fact that Z is in the sigma algebra σ(A) is a key property of the model that
increases the appeal of our results. This is so not only because it brings out the fact
that it is precisely the restriction to ﬁnite statements in the language that drives our
s ∈ S in the following obvious sense. For every given s ∈ S there exists a nested decreasing sequence
of sets {An}∞
n=1 with An ∈ A for every n, and such that An ↓ s. For want of a better term, in what
follows we will refer to this feature of our model as the “zoom-in” property.
26Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the following notation. If B is any algebra of sets,
then σ(B) denotes the sigma algebra generated by B.
Given the zoom-in property mentioned in footnote 25 above, the formal proof of this statement
is trivial. The zoom-in property tells us that every singleton s ∈ S is in σ(A). But since S is itself
countable, it then follows that every subset of S is in fact in σ(A).Undescribable Contingencies 29
results. It also rules out another possible type of phenomenon that may give rise
to failures of the approximation result. This is best discussed with reference to a
concrete example.
It is well known that if we let (Ω,σ(B),ν) be a measure space (equipped with the
sigma algebra σ(B), and ν a countably additive ﬁnite measure), then given any non-
measurable set B∗ 6∈ σ(B), we can extend the measure ν to B∗ in an arbitrary way
as follows.27 The sigma algebra σ(B) can be (minimally) enlarged to σ(B)∗ so as to
include B∗, and the measure ν can be extended to ν∗, where ν∗ assigns any arbitrary
value to B∗, provided it is between the inner and outer measure of B∗ under the
original measure ν. Moreover, under ν∗, the event B∗ is independent of any event B
in the original sigma algebra σ(B).
Clearly, the set B∗ will display ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability if we take our
algebra of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets to be B (or even the entire sigma algebra σ(B) that it
generates). So, the approximation result will fail in the strongest possible way. Yet,
there is a clear sense in which this construction is unsatisfactory. The non-measurable
set B∗ has in a very real sense no relationship with the algebra B, or even with the
generated sigma algebra σ(B). This is precisely the reason it can be assigned an
arbitrary measure and taken to be independent of all events in σ(B). If B is meant
to embody the statements of a language, then the set B∗ has no relationship with
the language at all. It cannot be interpreted as a ﬁnite or even a countably inﬁnite
statement of the language embodied in B. The viability of this arbitrary construction
is simply a by-product of the fact that there exists sets that are not σ(B)-measurable
in the ﬁrst place.
By contrast, the undescribable contingency Z of Proposition 3 is in the sigma
algebra σ(A), and its density µ(Z) is computed in exactly the same way as the
density of any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set A ∈ A — it is its limit frequency in S.
27See for instance Billingsley (1995, Exercise 1.4.10) for the case in which Ω is the unit interval,
or Royden (1988, Theorem 12.38) for the general case in which Ω is any underlying space equipped
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10. Necessity Re-Visited
In Section 2 above we claimed that two critical ingredients of our model are necessary
features of a model that delivers the results that we obtained here. In this section,
we substantiate this claim.
10.1. Finitely Additive Probabilities
The most unusual feature of our model is undoubtedly the fact that the measure µ
that we place on the state space S is ﬁnitely additive but fails countable additivity.
It turns out to be the case that this is a necessary feature of any model in which
there is an event that cannot be approximated by events in an algebra A, but which
is in the sigma algebra σ(A) generated by A. To put this in reverse, if we deﬁne any
algebra of events A over a state space S, and let µ be a countably additive measure
over (S,A), then any event Z in σ(A) can be approximated arbitrarily closely by
events in A. So, in particular, no such Z could display ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne
variability.
To state this claim formally, we obviously ﬁrst need to specify what we mean by
approximating an event in a probability space.
Deﬁnition 9. Approximation: Let any set S be given, and A an algebra of subsets
of S. Let also µ be a ﬁnitely additive probability measure on (S,A) (not necessarily
countably additive). Let µ∗ be any extension of µ to the sigma algebra σ(A).
We say that the approximation result holds for the space (S,A,µ) if and only if
for every Z ∈ σ(A) and every real number ε > 0 there exists a set A ∈ A such that
µ∗(Z4A) < ε.28
Clearly, if the approximation result holds for a space (S,A,µ), then no set Z ∈
σ(A) will display ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability in the sense of Deﬁnitions 7
and 8.
28Throughout the rest of the paper we use the standard notation C4D to indicate the symmetric
diﬀerence between the two sets C and D. In other words we deﬁne C4D = [C − (C ∩ D)] ∪
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Our next step is to formalize the claim that a model of undescribable contingencies
that delivers a set Z ∈ σ(A) that cannot be approximated in the sense of Deﬁnition
9 must involve a measure µ that fails to be countably additive.
Proposition 4. Finitely Additive Measures: Let a space (S,A,µ) as in Deﬁnition 9
be given, and assume that µ is countably additive on A.
Then the approximation result holds for the space (S,A,µ).
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is not hard to outline. Roughly speaking,
since µ is countably additive on the algebra A it has, by Carath´ eodory’s Extension
Theorem,29 a unique countably additive extension µ∗ to the sigma algebra σ(A). Con-
sider now a sequence of sets {An} in A such that the symmetric diﬀerence An∆Z ↓ ∅.
Then, by countable additivity µ∗(An∆Z) converges to 0 and hence the approximation
result holds.
If a set Z displays ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability, the approximation result
fails strongly in the sense that Z cannot be approximated at all (Z is independent of
all A ∈ A), and it fails uniformly over the entire state space S. These two features
of our model determine the fact that not only µ must fail countable additivity, but it
must fail to be countably additive in the strongest possible way.
The following is a standard result that will enable us to formalize the claim we
have just made.30
Remark 3. Decomposition Theorem: Let any set S be given, and A an algebra of
subsets of S. Let also µ be a ﬁnitely additive probability measure on (S,A) (not
necessarily countably additive).
Then µ can be written in the form µ = µCA + µFA, where µCA is a countably
additive measure, and µFA is purely ﬁnitely additive in the sense that there does not
exist a non-zero countably additive measure ν on (S,A) such that ν ≤ µFA.
29See, for instance, Royden (1988, Ch. 12.2).
30Many of the results we quote and use in our arguments below are well known in the mathematical
literature. A measure that fails countable additivity is known as a “charge.” The most comprehensive
reference of which we are aware in this ﬁeld is Rao and Rao (1983).Undescribable Contingencies 32
Moreover, the decomposition of µ into µCA + µFA is unique.31
Finite invariance and ﬁne variability imply failure of countable additivity in the
very strong sense that µ must be purely ﬁnitely additive in the sense of Remark 3.
Proposition 5. Pure Finite Additivity: Let any set S be given, and A an algebra of
subsets of S. Let also µ be a ﬁnitely additive probability measure on (S,A).
Assume now that there exists a set Z ∈ σ(A) that displays ﬁnite invariance and
ﬁne variability.
Then the unique decomposition of µ into µFA + µCA (as in Remark 3) is such
that µFA = µ, and µCA is identically equal to zero.32
Intuitively, if the countably additive component of µ is not identically equal to
zero then, from Proposition 4, we can approximate, at least in part, any event in the
sigma algebra σ(A). This contradicts the presence of a set like Z that displays ﬁnite
invariance and ﬁne variability.
Once we know that µ is purely ﬁnitely additive, it is easy to see that there cannot
be a state s in S that has point mass. So, another necessary feature of a model that
delivers ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability is a measure µ that is “diﬀuse” in a well
deﬁned sense.33
Proposition 6. Diﬀuse Probabilities: Let any set S be given, and A an algebra of
subsets of S. Let also µ be a ﬁnitely additive probability measure on (S,A).
Then if µ is purely ﬁnitely additive as in Proposition 5 there cannot be a state in
S that has point mass in the following sense. There exists no s ∈ S and ε > 0 such
that s ∈ A implies µ(A) ≥ ε for every A ∈ A.34
31The proof of this claim can be found for instance in Rao and Rao (1983, Theorem 10.2.1). Notice
that the standard name for a purely ﬁnitely additive measure like µFA is that of a “pure charge.”
32In the terminology of Rao and Rao (1983), µ is a “pure charge.”
33We refrain from using the term “non-atomic” here since a whole host of technical problems arise
if one attempts to deﬁne this term in a general way for a measure µ that fails countable additivity.
Rao and Rao (1983, Ch. 5) devote an entire chapter to the subject.
34Obviously, if {s} ∈ A, then Proposition 6 tells us that it cannot be that µ(s) > 0.Undescribable Contingencies 33
10.2. Smallness of the State Space
The set C = {0,1}N of all inﬁnite strings of 0s and 1s, of course has the cardinality
of the continuum. Yet, the state space S that we use in Propositions 2 and 3 is
countable. In some obvious sense, the state space that we used above to deliver
complex undescribable contingencies is “small” relative to C. This is a signiﬁcant
statement since, in principle, one could attempt to use the features in the underlying
language to describe any element of C. Nevertheless, in the model we have developed
above, only countably many elements of C do in fact correspond to an actual “physical
state.”
It turns out that the fact that S must be a “small” subset of C, is also a conse-
quence of the fact that the model admits a set Z that displays ﬁnite invariance and
ﬁne variability. Hence this is also a necessary feature of a model of undescribable
contingencies that delivers a strong failure of the approximation result, as is the case
here.
We now proceed with the formal version of the claim we just made, postponing an
intuitive discussion of the assumptions and result until the statement has been made
precise.
Let λ denote the “uniform” distribution on C. By this we mean the (unique,
countably additive) probability distribution on C obtained as the product distribution
on the features and under which λ(A(i,0)) = λ(A(i,1)) = 1/2 for every feature i.
Note that this may be viewed as the translation of the Lebesgue measure on C.35
Proposition 7. Zero Lebesgue Measure: Let S be any subset of C = {0,1}N, and let
A be the algebra of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets of Deﬁnition 3.
35To see this, embed the interval [0,1] in the real line as a subset of C, denoted C1, by identifying
each point in [0,1] with its binary expansion. This assignment is unique except for a countable
number of points in [0,1] that have two possible binary expansions. For these points, we choose a
unique point in C. Then the restriction of λ to C coincides with the Lebesgue measure on [0,1].
The measure λ is deﬁned formally in Deﬁnition A.1 in the Appendix. Remarks A.4 and A.5
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Suppose that µ is such that the space (S,A,µ) admits a set Z ∈ σ(A) that displays
ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne variability. Assume also that µ(A) > 0 for every A ∈ A.36
Then λ(S) = 0.
Broadly speaking, Proposition 7 is a consequence of the fact that µ must be purely
ﬁnitely additive, which in turn of course is a consequence of ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne
variability.
Intuitively, it is easiest to think of Proposition 7 in the following way. Suppose
that we equip the set C with the algebra of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets A and we place a
ﬁnitely additive measure, say ν, on this pair. Then, by a theorem of Kolmogorov we
know that ν must necessarily be countably additive as well.37 It is then clear that we
could not have our state space S equal to C, since to deliver ﬁnite invariance and ﬁne
variability we need a measure that is purely ﬁnitely additive, as Proposition 5 above
shows.
Could it then be that S contains at least a subset of C which, conditional on say
the ﬁrst m features being equal to a given sequence of 0s and 1s, contains all elements
of C (a whole “cylinder”)? The answer to this question is no. Roughly speaking, we
could then apply the same theorem to this subset of C to obtain at least a “portion”
of ν that is countably additive. But this is impossible if the measure is to be purely
ﬁnitely additive, as Proposition 5 asserts that it must be if we are to obtain ﬁnite
invariance and ﬁne variability. It follows that the state space of a model of complex
undescribable contingencies that delivers the results in Propositions 2 and 3 must
have a state space that is a “small” subset of C as in Proposition 7.
36Note that we make the assumption that µ(A) > 0 for every A ∈ A purely for the sake of
simplicity. Without it we would need to take care separately of any possible “superﬂuous” portion
of C. By this we mean that, for instance, µ could assign a mass of zero to the set of all states in
S that have, say, feature 1 equal to 1. In this case it is possible that this entire cylinder in C is
included in S. Since this part of µ is identically equal to 0, it would be purely ﬁnitely additive in
the sense of Remark 3 since both its countably additive component and its purely ﬁnitely additive
components are identically equal to 0.
37See for instance Billingsley (1995, Theorem 2.3) or Doob (1994, Theorem V.6).Undescribable Contingencies 35
11. Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to construct a contracting environment in which
some contingencies have the following properties. Their probabilities and conse-
quences are understood by all concerned, and all agents involved use this information
to compute expected utilities arising from any possible ﬁnite ex-ante contract. Yet
these contingencies are undescribable in the sense that any attempt to describe them
in a ﬁnite ex-ante agreement must fail. The contracting parties cannot describe these
contingencies to any degree that will improve their expected utilities relative to an
agreement that ignores them altogether. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the
contracting parties’ language can in fact distinguish between any two states.
In this paper we have considered an environment in which a particularly stark
failure of the approximation of Anderlini and Felli (1994) takes place. In particular,
we obtain undescribable contingencies, like Z above, that display ﬁnite invariance and
ﬁne variability. So, the approximation results fails “uniformly” in that membership
of no ﬁnitely describable set constitutes useful information about membership of Z.
It is clearly possible to envision intermediate cases in which, say, knowing that
the ﬁrst feature of a state is 0 tells us something about its membership of Z, but it
is still the case that Z cannot be approximated in the sense of Deﬁnition 9.38
In an earlier version of this paper (Al-Najjar, Anderlini, and Felli 2002) we develop
formally a batch of results that deal with these intermediate cases. What follows is a
brief sketch.
It is possible to characterize tightly what the optimal ﬁnite contract looks like in
the general case in which the conditional density of Z is not equal across all ﬁnitely
deﬁnable sets in the algebra A. Applying again the Kolmogorov theorem that we
cited in Section 10.2,39 we can identify the unique countably additive measure on the
continuum set C that agrees with the conditional density of Z, µ(Z|·), on every A in
38Note that in this case, from Proposition 4 we still know that the measure µ must fail to be
countably additive.
39See footnote 37 above and Remark A.3 in the Appendix.Undescribable Contingencies 36
A.40 Using this measure and keeping ﬁxed the parties’ utility functions we can then
deﬁne an “auxiliary” contracting problem on the state space C.
Since the ingredients of the auxiliary contracting problem are all “standard” it
can be solved using familiar techniques. It is then relatively easy to show that the
solution to the auxiliary problem fully characterizes the optimal ﬁnite contract in the
general case.
Hence the optimal ﬁnite contract is not “null” in the general case. It captures the
variability of the conditional density of Z that can be embodied in its unique count-
ably additive “translation” to C that we have mentioned above. All other variability
in the characteristic function of Z cannot be captured at all by any ﬁnite contract.
Hence it can be safely ignored in the characterization of the optimal ﬁnite contract
that the parties will sign.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the set C of inﬁnite sequences of 0s and 1s, C = {0,1}N, with
typical element c and let ci be the i-th digit of the sequence c. Let also
˜ A(i,j) = {c ∈ C such that ci = j} (A.1)
Let H denote the set of all inﬁnite sequences {c1,...,cn,...} with cn ∈ C for every n. Let
{˜ cn}∞
n=1 be an inﬁnite sequence of i.i.d. random variables with (countably additive) distribution ˜ µ
over C, and let P be the (product) probability distribution that this yields for H.




n=1 χ ˜ A(i,j)(cn) =







Clearly, since P(M(i,j)) = 1 for every i and j, and of course P is countably additive, we must also
have P(M) = 1, and therefore M 6= ∅.
40Of course, in the case of ﬁnite invariance, this would be the uniform measure on C.Undescribable Contingencies 37
It is now suﬃcient to choose S to be equal to any element of M to prove the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2: Fix any p ∈ (0,1) as in the statement of the proposition. Assume
that S is as in Proposition 1, and that it has the property that any ﬁnitely deﬁnable set A contains
a countable inﬁnity of elements. This is clearly possible from the construction in the proof of
Proposition 1.
Deﬁne a stochastic process {˜ h1,...,˜ hn,...} where each random variable ˜ hn takes values in {0,1}.
Let H denote the set of all realizations of this process, and let P be the probability distribution
on H under which {˜ h1,...,˜ hn,...} are i.i.d. random variables with distribution (p,1 − p). Notice
that a realization h = {h1,...,hn ...} ∈ H of this process can be taken to be a candidate for the
characteristic function χZ : S → {0,1}. We now proceed to show that the claim can be proved by
setting χZ equal to any such realization of this process in a set of probability 1.
Let any h ∈ H be given and let A(h) be the set of states sn such that sn ∈ A and hn = 1.
The law of large numbers holds for any A ∈ A in the following sense. There is a set HA ⊂ H with







χA(h)(sn) = p µ(A) (A.3)
Since P(HA) = 1, clearly Q =
T
A∈A HA also has probability 1. Therefore Q 6= ∅. Now select any
element h = {h1,...,hn,...} of Q, and set χZ(sn) = hn for every n. This is our candidate χZ.
Since equation (A.3) holds for any A ∈ A it is obvious that Z displays ﬁnite invariance as in
Deﬁnition 7. Again from the fact that equation (A.3) holds for any A ∈ A, it is clear that Z has
well deﬁned frequencies as in Deﬁnition 5. Lastly, again from equation (A.3) it is immediate that
for any A ∈ A with µ(A) > 0 we must have that µ(Z|A) = p, as required.
Lemma A.1: Consider problem (12). Let Z have well deﬁned frequencies as in Deﬁnition 5 and
display ﬁnite invariance, as in Deﬁnition 7.
Let any ﬁnite contract t(·) ∈ F that is feasible in problem (12) be given, and {t1,...,tM} be
the range of t(·). Finally, for every i = 1,...,M, let Ti be the inverse image of ti under t(·).
Assume now that t(·) has the following property. There exist an i ∈ {1,...,M} and a j ∈
{1,...,M} such that µ(Ti) > 0 and µ(Tj) > 0. Then there exists another ﬁnite contract t0(·) ∈
F that is constant over Ti ∪ Tj, which is also feasible in problem (12) and which yields a higher
expected utility for agent 1.Undescribable Contingencies 38




∀sn ∈ Ti ∪ Tj (A.4)
The claim now follows directly by concavity of V , deﬁning U1 and U2 as in (1) and (2). The
rest of the details are omitted.
Lemma A.2: Let Z have well deﬁned frequencies (as in Deﬁnition 5) and display ﬁnite invariance
(as in Deﬁnition 7). Then an optimal ﬁnite contract t∗∗ that solves problem (12) exists unique, up
to a set of states of µ-measure zero. Moreover, t∗∗(sn) = 0 for all sn ∈ S, up to a set of states of
µ-measure zero.
Proof: Let Z as in the statement of the Lemma be given. Consider now the following maximization
problem.
max
x V (1 + x)µ(Z) + V (x)µ(Z)
s.t. V (−x)µ(Z) + V (1 − x)µ(Z) ≥ V (0)µ(Z) + V (1)µ(Z)
x ∈ R
(A.5)
The strict concavity of V (·) implies that problem (A.5) has a unique solution by completely
standard arguments. Let this solution be denoted by ˜ x.
The expected utility V (−x)µ(Z) + V (1 − x)µ(Z) is monotonically decreasing in x. Therefore
the constraint in problem (A.5) is satisﬁed only when x ≤ 0. Since the objective function in problem
(A.5), V (1 + x)µ(Z) + V (x)µ(Z), is monotonically increasing in x we conclude that the unique
solution of problem (A.5) is ˜ x = 0.
From Lemma A.1 above it is immediate that a solution to problem (A.5) must yield a solution
to problem (12). Therefore setting t∗∗(sn) = 0 for every sn ∈ S yields the unique (up to a set of
µ-measure zero) solution to problem (12).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let S be as in Proposition 1. Using Proposition 2 we can now choose Z to
have well deﬁned frequencies, display ﬁnite invariance and exhibit ﬁne variability, with µ(Z) ∈ (0,1).
The claim now follows directly from Lemma A.2.Undescribable Contingencies 39
Proof of Proposition 4: Since µ is countably additive on A by Catah´ eodory’s Extension Theorem
there exists a unique extension µ∗ of µ to σ(A). Since Z ∈ σ(A), we must then have that µ∗(Z) is





where the inﬁmum extends over all ﬁnite and inﬁnite sequences {On} that satisfy




Hence, for any real number ξ > 0 there exists a sequence {On} satisfying (A.7) and
X
n
µ(On) − µ∗(Z) < ξ (A.8)







µ(On) < η (A.9)




On ) − µ∗(Z) < ξ (A.10)




On ) < ξ (A.11)
From (A.9) we can now deduce that
X
n>m





On ) < η (A.13)Undescribable Contingencies 40







On ) < η (A.14)
It is straightforward to verify that the operator µ∗(·4·) is in fact a pseudo-metric on the sigma




On ) ≤ µ∗(Z 4
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n











On ) ≤ ξ + η (A.16)
Finally, since ξ and η are both arbitrary, and the ﬁnite union
Sm
n=1 On is clearly an element of A,
(A.16) is obviously enough to prove the claim.
We will use the following result in the proof of Proposition 5 below. We state it here without
proof purely for the sake of completeness. For the proof see Rao and Rao (1983, Theorem 10.3.1).
Remark A.1: Let any set S be given, and A an algebra of subsets of S. Let also µ be a ﬁnitely
additive probability measure on (S,A) (not necessarily countably additive).
Then µ is purely ﬁnitely additive if and only if for every countably additive measure ν on (S,A),
every A ∈ A, and every η > 0 there exists a set M ∈ A such that M ⊆ A
ν(M) < η and µ(A) − µ(M) < η (A.17)
Remark A.2: Let any set S be given, and A an algebra of subsets of S. Let also µ be a ﬁnitely
additive probability measure on (S,A) (not necessarily countably additive), and consider its (unique
decomposition) into µCA + µFA as in Remark 3.
Then for every η > 0 there exists a set B ∈ A such that
µCA(B) > µCA(S) − η and µFA(B) < η (A.18)Undescribable Contingencies 41
Proof: The claim is a straightforward consequence of Remark A.1.
Since µCA is countably additive and µFA is purely ﬁnitely additive, in Remark A.1 we can set
µ = µFA and ν = µCA. Hence, setting A = S, Remark A.1 now tells us that for every η > 0 there
exists a set M ∈ A such that
µCA(M) < η and µFA(S) − µFA(M) < η (A.19)
Next, set B = M. We then note that µCA(M) = µCA(S) − µCA(B) and µFA(M) = µFA(S) −
µFA(B). Substituting these equalities in (A.19) now immediately yields that for every η > 0 there
exists a set B ∈ A such that
µCA(S) − µCA(B) < η and µFA(S) − µFA(S) + µFA(B) < η (A.20)
Rearranging (A.20) then immediately gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 5: Use Remark 3 to write µ = µCA + µFA. From Proposition 4 we know
that µCA(S) < 1. Assume now that the Proposition is false. Then it must also be the case that
µCA(S) > 0.
Using Remark A.2 we know that for every η > 0 there exists a set B ∈ A such that
µCA(B) > µCA(S) − η and µFA(B) < η (A.21)
Since by assumption µ(Z) ∈ (0,1), we can choose η in (A.21) to satisfy
η < µCA(S)
µ(Z) − µ(Z)2
2 + µ(Z) + µ(Z)2 (A.22)
Notice next that since we know that µCA(S) > 0 (the contradiction hypothesis), and by as-
sumption µ(Z) ∈ (0,1), the inequalities in (A.21) and (A.22) guarantee that µ(B) ≥ µCA(B) >
0. Therefore, we can deﬁne the restrictions of µ and µCA to B ∈ A as µB = µ/µ(B) and µCA
B
= µCA/µCA(B). Further, deﬁne µFA
B to be identically equal to 0 if µFA(B) = 0, and µFA
B =
µFA/µFA(B) if µFA(B) > 0. Therefore, we can now write
µB = αµCA
B + (1 − α)µFA
B (A.23)












Next, deﬁne ZB = Z ∩ B, and notice that since Z displays ﬁnite invariance we have that ZB
displays ﬁnite invariance with respect to the restriction µB. In other words whenever A ∈ A and A
⊆ B we must have that µB(ZB|A) = µB(ZB), with the latter of course also equal to µ(Z).
Clearly, µCA
B is countably additive. Applying Proposition 4, for every real number ξ > 0 there
exists Qξ ∈ A such that
µCA
B (ZB|Qξ) < ξ and
 µCA
B (Qξ) − µCA
B (ZB)









B (Qξ) + (1 − α) µCA
B (Qξ)
<




B (Qξ) + (1 − α) µCA
B (Qξ)
<




In other words, using the fact that Z displays ﬁnite invariance with respect to µB, we can now write
α µB(ZB)(1 − µCA
B (Qξ)) < ξ + 1 − α (A.27)
Since µB(ZB) ≥ α µCA
B (ZB), we can now use (A.25) to re-write (A.27) as
α <
1 + ξ + µB(ZB)2
1 + µB(ZB)(1 − ξ)
(A.28)





However, since (A.29) directly contradicts (A.24) this is clearly enough to prove our claim.
Proof of Proposition 6: Since µ is purely ﬁnitely additive, from Remark 3 we know that µCA is









where the inﬁmum extends over all (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequences of disjoint sets {An} such that
An ∈ A for every n, and
S
n An = S.Undescribable Contingencies 43
Suppose now by way of contradiction that the statement of the Proposition is false. Then there
exists an s ∈ S such that µ(A) ≥ ε whenever A contains s. Since for any sequence {An} as above
we must have that s ∈ An for some n, this implies that the inﬁmum in (A.30) is at least ε. This
contradiction is enough to establish the result.
We will use the following result in the proof of Lemma A.3 below. We state it here without
proof purely for the sake of completeness. For the proof see Billingsley (1995, Theorem 2.3) or Doob
(1994, Theorem V.6).
Remark A.3: Consider the set C = {0,1}N, and any subset S of C. Assume that S is equipped
with the algebra A of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets, and equip C with the algebra ˜ A corresponding to the
algebra of ﬁnitely deﬁnable sets as follows.
As in (A.1) of the proof of Proposition 1, for each c ∈ C let {ci}i∈N be the sequence of digits in
{0,1} that deﬁne c, and for every i ∈ N and j ∈ {0,1} let
˜ A(i,j) = {c ∈ C such that ci = j} (A.31)
and let ˜ A be the algebra of subsets of C generated by the collection of sets of the type ˜ A(i,j). Notice
that in this way, using (8), we obviously have that for every ˜ A ∈ ˜ A it must be that ˜ A∩S = A ∈ A.
Let µ be any ﬁnitely additive measure on (A,S) (not necessarily countably additive). Then there
exists a unique countably additive measure ˜ µ on (σ( ˜ A),C) that satisﬁes ˜ µ( ˜ A) = µ(A) whenever ˜ A∩S
= A.41
Lemma A.3: Let any S ⊂ C be given, and consider a purely ﬁnitely additive measure µ on (S,A).
Let ˜ µ be the extension of µ to (σ( ˜ A),C) as in Remark A.3 above.
Then, for every real number ε > 0 there exists ˜ Aε ∈ σ( ˜ A) such that S ⊆ ˜ Aε and ˜ µ( ˜ Aε) < ε.
Proof: Since µ is purely ﬁnitely additive, appealing again to Theorem 10.2.2 of Rao and Rao (1983)








where the inﬁmum extends over all (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequences of disjoint sets {An} such that
An ∈ A for every n, and
S
n An = S. Hence, for every ε > 0 there exists a sequence of disjoint sets
{An,ε} such that An,ε ∈ A for every n,
S
n An,ε = S and
X
n
µ(An,) < ε (A.33)
41With a slight abuse of language we refer to ˜ µ as the extension of µ to (σ( ˜ A),C).Undescribable Contingencies 44
Consider any sequence {An,ε} as in (A.33) and the sequence { ˜ An,ε} of subsets of C corresponding
to it in the sense of Remark A.3, so that ˜ An,ε ∩ S = An,ε for every n. Let ˜ Aε =
S
n ˜ An,ε. Observe
that clearly ˜ Aε ∈ σ( ˜ A).
Notice next that
S
n An,ε = S ∩
S
n ˜ An,ε. Hence S = ˜ Aε ∩ S, and therefore S ⊆ ˜ Aε. Since ˜ µ
is countably additive we now have that ˜ µ( ˜ Aε) =
P
n ˜ µ( ˜ An,ε). Since by construction we must have
that ˜ µ( ˜ An,ε) = µ(An,ε) for every n we also know that
˜ µ( ˜ Aε) =
X
n




Using (A.33), and (A.34) it is now immediate that ˜ µ( ˜ Aε) < ε, as required.
Lemma A.4: Let any S ⊂ C be given, and consider a purely ﬁnitely additive measure µ on (S,A).
Let ˜ µ be the extension of µ to ( ˜ A,C) as in Remark A.3 above.
Then, there exists ˜ S ∈ σ( ˜ A) such that S ⊆ ˜ S and ˜ µ( ˜ S) = 0.
Proof: From Lemma A.3 we know that, given any sequence εm → 0 we can construct a correspond-
ing sequence of sets { ˜ Aεm} such that S ⊆ ˜ Aεm, ˜ µ( ˜ Aεm) < εm, and ˜ Aεm ∈ σ( ˜ A) for every m. To
prove the claim it is then suﬃcient to set ˜ S =
T
m ˜ Aεm and to notice that it must be the case that
˜ S ∈ σ( ˜ A).
Remark A.4: Each element c of C = {0,1}N can be interpreted as the binary expansion of a real
number r in the interval [0,1] by taking the elements of the sequence c to be the digits of the binary
expansion of r following a “0” and the “decimal” point.
This map assign a unique real in [0,1] to each element of C except for those that are of the form
{c1,...,cm, 1, 0,...,0,...} and {c1,...,cm, 0, 1,...,1,...} which obviously correspond to the same
real number r. Notice that there are countably many such pairs of elements of C.
In what follows we will denote by C0 the set of elements of C that are of the form {c1,...,cm, 1,
0,...,0,...}, excluding {0,...,0,...}, and by C1 the remainder of C so that C1 = C − C0.
From what we have just stated, it is clear that we can assign a unique real in [0,1] to each
element of C1 and a unique element of C1 to every real in [0,1].
Finally, notice that if we deﬁne the sigma algebra σ( ˜ A1) of subsets of C1 as consisting of the
collection of sets ˜ A∩C1 for every ˜ A ∈ σ( ˜ A) we obtain that σ( ˜ A1) contains all the half-open intervals
in [0,1] of the form (a,b] where a and b are reals in [0,1].Undescribable Contingencies 45
Remark A.5: Consider the sigma algebra σ( ˜ A0) of subsets of C consisting of the collection of sets
˜ A ∩ C0 for every ˜ A ∈ σ( ˜ A). Consider also the sigma algebra σ( ˜ A1) of Remark A.4.
Then σ( ˜ A) = σ( ˜ A0) ∪ σ( ˜ A1).
Proof: Since C0 is a countable set it is enough to notice that every singleton set is already contained
in σ( ˜ A). Hence σ( ˜ A0) consists of all subsets of C0. The assertion is then immediate from the
deﬁnition of σ( ˜ A0) and σ( ˜ A1). The details are omitted.
Deﬁnition A.1: Recall that from Remark A.5 we know that σ( ˜ A) = σ( ˜ A0) ∪ σ( ˜ A1). The Lebesgue
measure λ on C is then deﬁned as follows.
For every ˜ A in σ( ˜ A), set λ( ˜ A) = 0 if ˜ A ∈ σ( ˜ A0), and λ( ˜ A) = L( ˜ A) if ˜ A ∈ σ( ˜ A1) where L is the
Lebesgue measure on the real interval [0,1] deﬁned in the standard way.
Finally, as is standard, we take λ to be the completion of the measure we have just deﬁned in
the sense that it is deﬁned and is equal to zero on all subsets of all measurable sets that have zero
measure.42
Lemma A.5: Let ˜ µ be the extension of µ to (σ( ˜ A),C) as in Remark A.3, and assume that µ is
such that µ(A) > 0 for every A ∈ A.
Then supp(˜ µ) = C, where supp(·) indicates the support of a given measure.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there is a non-empty open set O in C such that ˜ µ(O) = 0. (We take
O to be open in the product topology generated by the discrete topology on each coordinate of the
elements of {0,1}N.)
We will show that for every open set O we can ﬁnd an ˜ A ∈ ˜ A that is contained in O. Since
˜ µ( ˜ A) = µ( ˜ A ∩ S) and the latter is, by assumption, positive this yields a contradiction and hence is
suﬃcient to prove the claim.
Assume by way of contradiction that we can ﬁnd a non-empty open O ⊆ C such that ˜ A 6⊆ O for
every ˜ A ∈ ˜ A.
Fix c ∈ O and consider the nested sequence of sets { ˜ An} where for every n, ˜ An ∈ ˜ A is the set
(the “cylinder”) of all those ˆ cs that have the ﬁrst n digits equal to the ﬁrst n digits of c.
By our contradiction hypothesis it must be that ˜ An 6⊆ O for every n. Hence, for every n we
must be able to ﬁnd a ˆ cn ∈ ˜ An and ˆ cn 6∈ O.
Clearly, the sequence {ˆ cn} converges to c. But since ˆ cn 6∈ O for every n, and c ∈ O, this
contradicts the fact that O is open.
42See for instance Billingsley (1995, p. 45).Undescribable Contingencies 46
Proof of Proposition 7: Let ˜ µ be the extension of µ to (σ( ˜ A),C) as in Remark A.3 and λ be the
Lebesgue measure on C as in Deﬁnition A.1.
By Lemma A.4 we know that there exists a set ˜ S ∈ σ( ˜ A) such that S ⊆ ˜ S and ˜ µ( ˜ S) = 0, and
By Lemma A.5 we know that supp(˜ µ) = C.
Since λ is, by deﬁnition, complete in the sense that it assigns measure zero to all subsets of
any set in σ( ˜ A) that have λ-measure zero, it is enough to show that λ( ˜ S) = 0.43 We proceed by
contradiction. Hence suppose that λ( ˜ S) > 0.
By the “Lebesgue Decomposition Theorem,”44 we know that ˜ µ can be (uniquely) written as ˜ µ
= ˜ µC + ˜ µS where ˜ µC is absolutely continuous with respect to λ, and ˜ µS is singular with respect to
λ.
Let QS = supp(˜ µS) and QC = supp(˜ µC). Since supp(˜ µ) = C, we must have that C = QS ∪ QC.
Hence ˜ S = [ ˜ S ∩ QS] ∪ [ ˜ S ∩ QC].
Notice that, since ˜ µS is singular with respect to λ, we immediately know that λ( ˜ S ∩ QS) = 0.
Hence, by our contradiction hypothesis it must be that λ( ˜ S ∩ QC) > 0.
Now let f be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ˜ µC with respect to λ, which of course we know
exists because ˜ µC is absolutely continuous with respect to λ. Notice that it must be the case that
f > 0 except for a set of λ-measure zero on ˜ S ∩ QC. Hence λ(˜ S ∩ QC) > 0 implies that
˜ µC( ˜ S ∩ QC) =
Z
˜ S∩QC
f dλ > 0 (A.35)
However, since ˜ µ = ˜ µC + ˜ µS and ˜ µ( ˜ S) = 0, we must obviously have that ˜ µC( ˜ S ∩ QC) = 0. This
contradiction is suﬃcient to prove the claim.
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